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(Editor's Note: Hyperlink for referenced document follows article.)

Washington Post

February 4, 2006

Pg. 1

**Ability To Wage 'Long War' Is Key To Pentagon Plan**

***Conventional Tactics De-Emphasized***

By Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon, readying for what it calls a "long war," yesterday laid out a new 20-year defense strategy that envisions U.S. troops deployed, often clandestinely, in dozens of countries at once to fight terrorism and other nontraditional threats.

Major initiatives include a 15 percent boost in the number of elite U.S. troops known as Special Operations Forces, a near-doubling of the capacity of unmanned aerial drones to gather intelligence, a \$1.5 billion investment to counter a biological attack, and the creation of special teams to find, track and defuse nuclear bombs and other catastrophic weapons.

China is singled out as having "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States," and the strategy in response calls for accelerating the fielding of a new Air Force long-range strike force, as well as for building undersea warfare capabilities.

The latest top-level reassessment of strategy, or Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), is the first to fully take stock of the starkly expanded missions of the U.S. military -- both in fighting wars abroad and defending the homeland -- since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

The review, the third since Congress required the exercise in the 1990s, has been widely anticipated because Donald H. Rumsfeld is the first defense secretary to conduct one with the benefit of four years' experience in office.

Rumsfeld issued the previous QDR in a hastily redrafted form days after the 2001 strikes.

The new strategy, summarized in a 92-page report, is a road map for allocating defense resources. It draws heavily on the lessons learned by the U.S. military since 2001 in Iraq, Afghanistan and counterterrorism operations. The strategy significantly refines the formula -- known as the "force planning construct" -- for the types of major contingencies the U.S. military must be ready to handle.

Under the 2001 review, the Pentagon planned to be able to "swiftly defeat" two adversaries in overlapping military campaigns, with the option of overthrowing a hostile government in one. In the new strategy, one of those two campaigns can be a large-scale, prolonged "irregular" conflict, such as the counterinsurgency in Iraq.

In the 2001 strategy, the U.S. military was to be capable of conducting operations in four regions abroad -- Europe, the Middle East, the "Asian littoral" and Northeast Asia. But the new plan states that the past four years demonstrated the need for U.S. forces to "operate around the globe, and not only in and from the four regions."

Yet, although the Pentagon's future course is ambitious in directing that U.S. forces become more versatile, agile and capable of tackling a far wider range of missions, it calls for no net increases in troop levels and seeks no dramatic cuts or additions to currently planned weapons systems.

For example, the active-duty Army will revert by 2011 to its pre-2001 manpower of 482,400, with the additional Army Special Operations Forces incorporated in that number, defense officials said. The Air Force will reduce its strength by about 40,000 personnel.

Moreover, the review's key assumptions betray what Pentagon leaders acknowledge is a certain humility regarding the Defense Department's uncertainty about what the world will look like over the next five, 10 or 20 years, as well as its realization that the U.S. military cannot attain victory alone.

"U.S. forces in all probability will be engaged somewhere in the world in the next decade where they're not currently engaged. But I can tell you with no resolution at all where that might be, when that might be or how that might be," Ryan Henry, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, said at a Pentagon news briefing unveiling the QDR.

"Things get very fuzzy past the five-year point," Henry said of the review in a talk last month.

At the same time, Henry stressed yesterday, "we cannot win this long war by ourselves."

When a major crisis, such as a terrorist strike or outbreak of hostilities, occurs -- requiring a "surge" in forces -- the U.S. military will plan for "somewhat higher level of contributions from international allies and partners, as well as other Federal agencies," the review concludes.

The new strategy marks a clear shift away from the Pentagon's long-standing emphasis on conventional wars of tanks, fighter jets and destroyers against nation-states. Instead, it concentrates on four new goals: defeating terrorist networks; countering nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; dissuading major powers such as China, India and Russia from becoming adversaries; and creating a more robust homeland defense.

Central to the first two goals is a substantial 15 percent increase in U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), now with 52,000 personnel, including secret Delta Force operatives skilled in counterterrorism.

The review calls for a one-third increase in Army Special Forces battalions, whose troops are trained in languages and to work with indigenous fighters; an increase in Navy SEAL teams; and the creation of a new SOF squadron of unmanned aerial vehicles to "locate and target enemy capabilities" in countries where access is difficult.

In addition, civil affairs and psychological operations units will gain 3,500 personnel, a 33 percent increase, while the Marine Corps will establish a 2,600-strong Special Operations force for training foreign militaries, conducting reconnaissance and carrying out strikes.

"SOF will increase their capacity to perform more demanding and specialized tasks, especially long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments and denied areas," the report says. By 2007, SOF will have newly modified Navy submarines, each armed with 150 Tomahawk missiles, for reaching "denied areas" and striking individuals or other targets.

"SOF will have the capacity to operate in dozens of countries simultaneously" and will deploy for longer periods to build relationships with "foreign military and security forces," it says.

To conduct strikes against terrorists and other enemies -- work typically assigned to Delta Force members and SEAL teams -- these forces will gain "an expanded organic ability to locate, tag and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally," the report says.

The growth will also allow for the creation of small teams of operatives assigned to "detect, locate, and render safe" nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- as well as to prevent their transfer from states such as North Korea to terrorist groups.

To strengthen homeland defense, the report calls for improving communications and command systems so that military efforts can be better coordinated with state and local governments.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/03/AR2006020301853.html>

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## Quadrennial Defense Review Report

(NOTE: After accessing link directly below, click on picture of QDR cover in box, half-way down on the right-hand side. Second link below should take you directly to report.)

<http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/>

<http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>

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New York Times

February 4, 2006

## Bush's Budget To Call For Nuclear Partnership With Russia

By Matthew L. Wald and David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Feb. 3 — The Bush administration will propose in its budget on Monday the creation of an atomic energy partnership with Russia, offering countries a supply of fuel for their reactors under restrictions intended to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons, according to administration officials.

Under the proposal, the United States and Russia would provide reactor fuel to other countries and take back the spent fuel afterward to prevent its use in weaponry. President Bush called for a similar plan two years ago, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has recommended an international fuel system in which it would control custody of nuclear fuel.

Mr. Bush's new budget includes about \$250 million to continue research on two new technologies that are intended to significantly reduce the amount of nuclear waste requiring long-term disposal.

But one senior official called those techniques "a long way away," and Mr. Bush's own concerns about the plan, some officials say, explained why he did not include it in his State of the Union address on Tuesday.

The American program, once called the Global Nuclear Energy Initiative, will now be called an energy "partnership" to reflect the role of Russia and, eventually, other nations.

The timing is critical, because Russia is already negotiating with Iran on a deal to provide it with reactor fuel that — if the Iranians consent — could become a model for part of the new program, keeping the fuel technology out of the hands of countries that do not already have nuclear weapons.

Elements of the plan have been reported in The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal.

In addition to curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, the administration sees the plan as a way to promote the use of nuclear power at home by solving problems with the disposal of radioactive waste. The energy secretary is supposed to tell Congress next year whether a second dump, beyond the Yucca Mountain site near Las Vegas, will be needed.

But it is not clear when even the Yucca site can be opened.

The new plan relies on an experimental "fast" reactor that has been tried in France and Japan and found to be prone to catching fire and not cost-effective.

The program would also require changes in American law to allow the dumping of foreign-generated waste at Yucca, and it would face fierce domestic opposition because it would create a fuel processing industry that, because it converts solid waste into liquids that could leak, would be potentially more polluting than the current industry.

Frank von Hippel, a physicist at Princeton and a skeptic about the proposed technology, said the United States would probably have to volunteer to keep the unusable end-product wastes to induce countries to participate. "If they get the high-level waste back, what do they gain?" he said.

People who have been briefed on the plan say it will be included in the Energy Department's budget, expanding a year-old Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative at Los Alamos National Laboratory, for which \$79.2 million was appropriated. In addition, last year Congress gave the Energy Department \$50 million to find a site for storing nuclear waste and building a reprocessing factory, but the department does not appear to have begun significant work on that.

The proposal would take years to bear fruit, and some experts doubt that it is workable. But like the idea for hydrogen cars, it fits the Bush administration's preference for long-term, high-technology approaches to major energy problems.

It would once again get the United States into the business of nuclear reprocessing, a technology it dropped during the Ford administration. One expert said an advantage of having Russia as a partner, and possibly signing up France later, was that those two countries already had conventional reprocessing industries, while the new American system would be decades in the future.

In the conventional system, used commercially in this country in the late 1960's and early 70's, fuel was taken out of a reactor and dissolved in acid to separate usable material, leaving behind a very large residue that will be radioactive for a very long time.

In the new version, the tank would have two giant electrodes, which would sort the contents into material that could be reused, some of it with radioactive lifetimes measured in millennia, and material that could not be reused, most of which would lose its radioactivity in a few hundred years.

The volume of waste requiring long-term disposal would be reduced by 99 percent, according to advocates. But part of the volume reduction includes building a new class of reactors, not commercially demonstrated, that could use the most common form of uranium, called uranium-238, as fuel. At present uranium-238 is used in making plutonium, which is used as fuel.

A Congressional aide who specializes in the field said he was anticipating a request for an "industrial-scale demonstration" of the separation technology.

Scientists differ about whether fuel made through the new separation system would increase the risk of material being diverted for nuclear weapons.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/04/politics/04nuke.html>

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Washington Times

February 4, 2006

Pg. 4

## **New Pentagon Strategy Sees 'Long War' On Terror**

By Rowan Scarborough, The Washington Times

The Pentagon yesterday released its first comprehensive strategy since the September 11 attacks for sizing and deploying U.S. armed forces in the "long war" against terrorists.

It opted to keep much of the existing force of four years ago, but aims to put more emphasis on hunting down militants, blocking access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and using technology to build a faster, more agile group of warships, warplanes and combat brigades.

"The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war," states the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was last issued only a month after September 11, and lacked any of the lessons learned from fighting al Qaeda. "Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere."

In a cover letter, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld called the first wartime QDR "a roadmap for change, leading to victory."

There is one big constant: the 2-million strong active and reserve force must still be able to wage two major conflicts nearly simultaneously. But the QDR adds a significant new task: The force, whose yearly budget exceeds \$400 billion, needs to sustain a long war against Islamic extremists across the globe. The military has come to realize the enemy is moving from "nation-state threats to decentralized network threats from non-state enemies," the QDR states.

Among major objectives is that the military must do a better job to "find, fix and finish" the enemy -- shorthand for locating al Qaeda terrorists and either killing or capturing them.

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter, California Republican, normally a strong Rumsfeld ally, was not impressed, saying the document is driven more by available budget dollars than by threat-based requirements.

"It appears the QDR has become a budget-driven exercise, which limits its utility to Congress," Mr. Hunter said. He said the committee, which receives the Pentagon's fiscal 2007 \$439 billion budget next week, is doing its own review which "will provide us with a more complete picture of America's national security needs."

Among the Pentagon's major objectives:

- \*Increase special operations, the lead force in tracking and eliminating al Qaeda, by 15 percent by creating new Green Beret "A Teams." Sister organizations, civil affairs and psychological operations, will add 3,700 personnel -- a 33 percent increase. The Marine Corps will stand up its first special operations command.

- \*Set up a special WMD task force, complete with special operations forces, which will be activated on a moment's notice to intercept shipments of WMD.

- \*By 2018, field a new penetrating bomber, likely as a complement to the B-2 stealth bomber. The Air Force will continue to operate 86 fighter and bomber wings. Similarly, the Navy will maintain 11 aircraft carrier strike groups. Terrorists are not the Pentagon's only worry: China is the subject of some blunt talk. "China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies," the QDR says.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060203-111447-2296r.htm>

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New York Times

February 4, 2006

## **U.S. Compromises On Wording Of Iran Nuclear Resolution**

By Elaine Sciolino

VIENNA, Feb. 3 — The 35-nation board of the International Atomic Energy Agency put off a vote on a landmark resolution on Iran's nuclear program on Friday, largely because of American opposition to a clause indirectly criticizing Israel's nuclear weapons status, according to several diplomats.

But late Friday evening the dispute was apparently resolved after the Americans backed down and accepted compromise language, an American official said.

In Washington, R. Nicholas Burns, under secretary of state for political affairs, said the way had been cleared for the adoption of the resolution on Saturday. "The I.A.E.A. board is now poised to adopt a very important resolution declaring the international community's lack of confidence in Iran," he said. "This is a major development on this issue."

Earlier in the day, diplomats here had predicted the United States would have to accept a compromise on the clause, which mentions support for the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. The clause was insisted upon by Egypt, with the strong backing of the nonaligned nations on the agency's board.

Egypt and other Arab states routinely demand references to a "nuclear-free zone" in the Middle East in Security Council documents. They argue that Israel — which has never admitted that it has nuclear weapons and, unlike Iran, has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — should be made part of a general security framework in the Middle East.

The issue temporarily exposed a split between the Americans, who opposed the Egyptian demand, and Russia, China and the Europeans, who supported it.

On Thursday night, Britain circulated a new, informal draft that added a clause that recognized that "a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery."

That language reflected the official position of the 25-member European Union. But the United States delegation, led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, initially opposed the compromise language, saying it could be used by Iran as a propaganda weapon against Israel, four senior diplomats said.

"The Americans are worried that once it is there, it will stay there forever and allow the Iranians to hide behind it," one ambassador involved in the negotiations said.

It was not immediately clear which compromise Washington had agreed to, though a senior official said the resolution would make reference to a nuclear-free zone. Earlier, a State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, had said the United States accepted in principle that "we all hope for a day when the Middle East achieves a state where there are not nuclear weapons." Throughout the day on Friday, the Europeans pressed the Americans to change their position.

"It's five against one," said one European ambassador.

Another key ambassador called the Americans "dogmatists," predicting that for the resolution to pass, "The Americans will have to give in."

Gregory Schulte, the American ambassador to the agency, told reporters that he expected strong support when a vote was taken. "We are convinced we have a solid majority for the resolution that reports Iran to the Security Council," he said. "And that majority is growing."

Many diplomats here also said the resolution might not pass with as strong a majority as many had hoped, because of opposition among the 16-member bloc of nonaligned countries.

Diplomats met behind closed doors throughout the day to meet some of the demands of the nonaligned countries, which wanted to delete all references to the Security Council or at least delay any report to New York until after the nuclear agency makes its full assessment of Iran's nuclear program in March.

The current text is a compromise between the American push for immediate action against Iran by the Security Council and Russia's preference for a monthlong delay for more diplomacy.

The resolution mentions Iran's "many failures and breaches of its obligations" under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and "the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes."

In one important concession, the draft resolution was changed to reflect the fact that actions taken by Iran to build international "confidence" that it is not pursuing a nuclear weapon are "voluntary and non-legally binding."

In another development, Javad Vaidi, the head of Iran's nuclear delegation, told reporters on Friday that if the resolution reported Iran to the Security Council, it would be the end of a Russian proposal under which uranium would be enriched for Iran's energy purposes at a site in Russia under solely Russian authority.

Underscoring the fluid nature of the diplomacy, however, a Russian diplomat said that talks on the proposal were continuing.

On Thursday, Iran informed the I.A.E.A. in a letter that all "voluntary" nuclear cooperation with the agency would end if the agency's board reported Iran's nuclear case to the Security Council. That would mean that the agency would no longer be allowed to do voluntary spot inspections and would lose access to important sites and installations.

*Steven R. Weisman contributed reporting from Washington for this article.*

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/04/international/europe/04iran.html>

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Washington Post

February 5, 2006

Pg. 1

## **Iran To Face Security Council**

### ***Tehran Defiant On IAEA Vote***

By John Ward Anderson, Washington Post Foreign Service

VIENNA, Feb. 4 -- Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency voted Saturday to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council over concerns that the country is trying to develop nuclear weapons, decisively ending Iran's years-long effort to forestall action that could lead to further pressure on Tehran.

The 35-member IAEA board sent a resolution to the highest U.N. body, expressing "serious concerns" about Iran's nuclear ambitions after nearly three years of trying to verify whether the country was pursuing a nuclear program for civilian or military purposes.

In response to the IAEA vote, Iran announced that it would resume its uranium enrichment activities and would no longer allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

The decision, 27 to 3, handed the United States and European countries a diplomatic victory. Russia and China were initially reluctant to report Iran to the council but joined the stepped-up campaign after demanding that any action against Iran be deferred at least until March. In the end, just three countries -- Syria, Cuba and Venezuela -- voted against the measure. Five countries abstained.

The vote left unclear what action Iran might face. The Security Council could impose economic sanctions or an oil embargo against Iran. But Russia and China, which as permanent members of the council wield veto power, have expressed strong opposition to any significant punitive measures. U.S. and European diplomats have said that they envision a "graduated" diplomatic approach to slowly build pressure on Iran.

In forwarding the matter to the Security Council, the board's resolution cited "Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply" with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the "absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment."

The resolution signifies "a continuing lack of confidence in Iran's nuclear intentions," said British envoy Peter Jenkins. "Board members simply cannot understand why Iran is so determined to press on with its enrichment program." Some forms of enriched uranium can be used to make nuclear weapons, though Iran maintains its research will be used only to produce electrical power.



The Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, chastised the IAEA governing board for yielding to "political pressure of a few countries and without any legal justification."

"As of Sunday, the voluntary implementation of the additional protocol and other cooperation beyond the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has to be suspended under the law," Ahmadinejad said in a letter to Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh, who also is the head of the Iran's nuclear agency, Reuters reported.

In Washington, President Bush said in a statement that "the path chosen by Iran's new leaders -- threats, concealment, and breaking international agreements and IAEA seals -- will not succeed and will not be tolerated by the international community."

Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns called the vote "a powerful message of condemnation" and a "clear rebuke" of Iran.

"Diplomacy is now in a new phase," he told reporters in a conference call, warning that the Iranian government faces tough decisions in the coming month. "I cannot say we are filled with hope the Iranians will do the right thing."

Burns said that under an agreement reached in London this week with other permanent members of the Security Council, the United States will not press to bring up the Iranian issue this month, while the United States holds the council's presidency. But he said five demands made of Iran in the resolution -- including suspending enrichment activities and granting inspectors enhanced access to its facilities -- were the minimum steps Iran needed to take to avoid a Security Council debate in March.

"Iran is going to have to meet those conditions and show it has taken a fundamentally different course," Burns said.

"We are going to have to see a change of heart by Iran."

It was unclear whether Iran -- which has endured years of diplomatic isolation -- would step back from its positions. Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and its chief nuclear negotiator, recently said the country's decision in January to resume uranium enrichment activities after a voluntary, two-year suspension was "nonnegotiable." It was that decision that triggered the IAEA board meeting this week.

Some Iranian officials have also threatened to withdraw from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or to raise oil prices if their case was forwarded to the Security Council. Political analysts have also warned of Iran's ability to foment problems in neighboring Iraq.

Russian officials have offered to enrich uranium for Iran on Russian soil, a compromise that would allow Iran access to enriched uranium but prevent it from becoming engaged in one of the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel production cycle. But Javed Vaehidi, an Iranian nuclear negotiator, told the Associated Press on Saturday that the idea was now dead.

As a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to develop nuclear technology and to enrich uranium. But it became enmeshed in controversy in 2002 when Iranian dissidents disclosed that the country had concealed its nuclear programs for almost two decades. Iran suspended the most controversial parts of its activities, and European diplomats agreed not to pursue Security Council action while they conducted intensive negotiations to ensure that Iran's program was and would remain peaceful.

The negotiations floundered in August when Iran resumed uranium conversion, a prelude to enrichment, and again in January when it restarted work on its uranium enrichment program, prompting the Europeans to declare their negotiations at an impasse and to begin a drive to report Iran to the Security Council. U.S. officials said that move was long overdue.

In recent months, international inspectors have found documents in Iran that were related to bomb-making but no evidence of a bomb-making program. The inspectors have complained, however, that they have been unable to make a solid determination because Iran has not provided the relevant information or access to people, documents and facilities.

Recent provocative remarks by Ahmadinejad -- including questioning the Holocaust, saying Israel should be "wiped off the map" and offering to transfer nuclear know-how to other Islamic countries -- have increased concern about Iran's intentions and raised the pressure for the IAEA board to demand tougher confidence-building measures.

Several factors contributed to the lopsided vote Saturday, including a decision this week by the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China -- the five permanent members of the Security Council -- to give Iran a one-month grace period to adopt a more conciliatory approach.

The final resolution also removed any reference to Iran's "non-compliance" with its nuclear treaty obligations and the article of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that it has violated.

In an effort to win support from 16 members of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group dating from the Cold War, the resolution included a paragraph "recognizing that a solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery."

The language significantly softened the movement's demand for a reference to creating a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, which the United States saw as a slap at Israel.

The resolution is ambiguous about whether the IAEA board must act again at the end of the one-month grace period in order to officially request Security Council action. The United States believes the resolution moves the issue to the Security Council.

But other countries -- including many from the Non-Aligned Movement -- say the resolution simply informs the council about the issue, and that the IAEA board must vote again in another month if it wants the council to actually take action.

*Staff writer Glenn Kessler in Washington contributed to this report.*

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/04/AR2006020401288.html>

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Pittsburgh Post-Gazette

February 5, 2006

## A Syrian Sidestep?

*About those Iraqi WMDs: More signs are pointing to a neighborly transfer*

By Jack Kelly

Last week a man who had been deputy chief of Saddam Hussein's air force claimed Iraq moved weapons of mass destruction into Syria before the war began.

Special Republican Guard brigades loaded yellow barrels with the skull and crossbones sign on each barrel onto two airliners from which the seats had been removed, Georges Sada said. There were 56 flights in all.

"Saddam realized this time the Americans are coming," Mr. Sada told The New York Sun, one of a handful of news organizations which took note of what he had to say.

There are grounds for skepticism. Mr. Sada was deputy chief of the Iraqi air force during the first Gulf War, not the more recent one, and his account of the movement of WMD to Syria is secondhand.

Mr. Sada said he was told of the WMD transfer by the pilots of the two airliners, who approached him after Saddam was captured.

But Mr. Sada's is only the most recent of a series of accounts by people in a position to speak with authority who say (some of) Saddam's chemical and biological weapons wound up in Syria.

Last month Moshe Yaalon, who was Israel's top general at the time, said Iraq transported WMD to Syria six weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom began.

Last March, John A. Shaw, a former U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense for international technology security, said Russian Spetsnaz units moved WMD to Syria and Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

"While in Iraq I received information from several sources naming the exact Russian units, what they took and where they took both WMD materials and conventional explosives," Mr. Shaw told NewsMax reporter Charles Smith.

Retired Marine Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong was deputy commander of Central Command during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In September 2004, he told WABC radio that "I do know for a fact that some of those weapons went into Syria, Lebanon and Iran."

In January 2004, David Kay, the first head of the Iraq Survey Group which conducted the search for Saddam's WMD, told a British newspaper there was evidence unspecified materials had been moved to Syria from Iraq shortly before the war.

"We know from some of the interrogations of former Iraqi officials that a lot of material went to Syria before the war, including some components of Saddam's WMD program," Mr. Kay told the Sunday Telegraph.

Also that month, Nizar Nayuf, a Syrian journalist who defected to an undisclosed European country, told a Dutch newspaper he knew of three sites where Iraq's WMD was being kept. They were the town of al Baida near the city of Hama in northern Syria; the Syrian air force base near the village of Tal Snan, and the city of Sjinjar on the border with Lebanon.

In an addendum to his final report last April, Charles Duelfer, who succeeded David Kay as head of the Iraq Survey Group, said he couldn't rule out a transfer of WMD from Iraq to Syria.

"There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation," Mr. Duelfer said.



In a briefing for reporters in October 2003, retired Air Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper Jr., who was head of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency when the Iraq war began, said satellite imagery showed a heavy flow of traffic from Iraq into Syria just before the American invasion.

"I think the people below Saddam Hussein and his sons' level saw what was coming and decided the best thing to do was to destroy and disperse," Lt. Gen. Clapper said.

You haven't heard much about these reports, because they contradict the meme that Saddam either had no WMD, or destroyed it well before the Iraq war began.

The captured files of the Iraqi intelligence service, still mostly untranslated, could shed light on what did happen to Saddam's WMD.

John Loftus, a former Justice Department prosecutor, said a civilian contractor who has been among those examining the Mukhabarat files has found audiotapes of meetings in Saddam's office where WMD was discussed. The contractor, a former military intelligence analyst, will make the tapes public Feb. 17 at a conference sponsored by Intelligence Summit, a private group that Mr. Loftus heads.

Mr. Loftus wouldn't disclose the identity of the contractor in advance of the conference, but said his tapes have been verified by the National Security Agency. "This isn't a smoking gun. It's a smoking cannon," he said.

Those who have bet their political futures that Saddam had no WMD may be starting to sweat.

*Jack Kelly is national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo, Ohio.*

<http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06036/649858.stm>

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New York Times

February 6, 2006

**News Analysis**

## **Behind The Urgent Diplomacy: A Sense Iran Will Get The Bomb**

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, Feb. 5 — Hours after the United States and Europe prevailed in a contest over officially reporting Iran's history of clandestine nuclear activity to the United Nations Security Council, President Bush issued a statement on Saturday from his ranch, saying that the overwhelming vote showed "the world will not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons."

But even some of Mr. Bush's own advisers say that may prove an overstatement. Behind the diplomatic maneuvering, many of the diplomats and nuclear experts involved in the West's effort believe that stopping the program cold is highly unlikely, and probably impossible. They acknowledge that a more realistic goal now is to delay the day that Iran joins the nuclear club.

"Look, the Pakistanis and the North Koreans got there, and they didn't have Iran's money or the engineering expertise," said one senior official who is instrumental in putting together the American strategy. "Sooner or later, it's going to happen. Our job is to make sure it's later." By that time, he said, the hope is that a changed or different government is in power in Tehran.

In part, this is the newfound realism of an administration that has learned some hard lessons in Iraq, and is no longer quite so eager to talk about pre-empting what it regards as looming threats.

But the goal rises from a growing understanding of the damage wrought by the clandestine nuclear network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear engineer who began supplying the Iranians with designs, prototypes and equipment in the late 1980's, beneath the radar of American intelligence agencies. By the time Dr. Khan and the Iranians split in the mid-1990's, apparently in a dispute over money and advanced technology, Iran was already well advanced on the learning curve.

The evidence assembled by United Nations inspectors in the past two years — in inspections that Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, says will now end — indicates that the country has assembled an impressive network of new suppliers, built the basic facilities it needs, and identified the critical technologies it must master. Yet by virtually all assessments, that hasn't been enough. The Iranians still have several years of work ahead of them, a judgment restated last week by John D. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence. The painstaking process of actually manufacturing the material to make a fuel usable in weapons, by enriching uranium or reprocessing spent plutonium from power reactors, is a lot harder than it looks in the movies. There is some evidence the Iranians have encountered technological roadblocks.

"The obstacles give us some time, and you have to hope that we use it well, so that the current domestic consensus in favor of the nuclear program in Iran will break," said Robert J. Einhorn, who served as a top nonproliferation official in the Clinton administration and the early days of the Bush administration. "The vote yesterday was

impressive, and now it is about making Iran realize that none of this is cost-free — and that the result will be a change in the character of the regime, or at least a conclusion that this is a losing proposition for them."

While the United States has shared with foreign governments some of its own evidence and studies about Iran's nuclear program, the administration knows that after the debacle over the faulty intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, someone else must take the lead in assessing how close Iran is getting to a weapon. What has propelled the issue forward in the past few days were the declarations by the atomic energy agency itself, including officials who were openly skeptical about Mr. Bush's case against Iraq three years ago. For years the agency and its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, stayed publicly neutral on the question of whether Iran's program was peaceful, as it insists, or intended to build a weapon.

Dr. ElBaradei, whom the Bush administration tried to oust from his job only a year ago, circulated a report that pointed to links between Iran's ostensibly civilian nuclear program and its military. The report characterized designs that inspectors had found in Iran, supplied by Dr. Khan's network, as clearly "related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components." Those designs sketched out how to perfect uranium spheres, a shape that can be imploded to set off a nuclear explosion.

Those discoveries were so helpful in bolstering the case that Russia, China, Egypt, India and Yemen, among others, lined up against Iran in the 27-to-3 vote of the board of the United Nations nuclear energy agency. While it is possible that the mounting pressure may exploit fissures within Iran between those who want the bomb and those who value integration with the West, it may also set up a nationalistic response. And Iran's leaders have already noted that four other countries that the United States said should never become nuclear powers — Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea — have all made the leap and are now, with the exception of North Korea, largely accepted as members of the nuclear club.

Moreover, few see that Washington has many options. "Can you delay the onset of the Iranian bomb? Maybe," said Charles Ferguson, an expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. But even taking military action against Iran's known nuclear sites, he said, could "stimulate them to cross the nuclear Rubicon because you've showed your hand, you've showed that you're willing to use military force to try to damage their nuclear program."

That may be where the debate is headed. Mr. Bush, in his public statements, has begun reiterating that all his options are on the table, words that have shades of his comments about Iraq three years ago. But he has been deliberately less fiery, mindful of not fracturing the coalition he has built. His aides, in contrast, have been sent out in recent days with stronger messages about what the world would look like if Iran had a bomb. And in Munich this weekend, Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican, staking out a position that is more hawkish than anything the Bush administration has said in public, put the predicament this way:

"There is only one thing worse than military action," he said, "and that is a nuclear-armed Iran."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/06/politics/06assess.html?pagewanted=all>

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Newsweek

February 13, 2006

## Will Israel Strike Iran?

***The X Factor: Israel's military planners say they know how to forestall Tehran's nuclear schemes. The options—and their cost.***

By Kevin Peraino and John Barry

As scary as the idea may sound, the Israelis may not be bluffing. Their defense experts display no doubt whatsoever that Israel's Air Force can cripple Iran's nuclear program if necessary. The trick, they say, is to go after the system's weak spots. "You need to identify the bottlenecks," says a senior Israeli military source, asking not to be named for security reasons. "There are not very many. If you take them out, then you really undermine the project." Shlomo Brom, a former Israeli armed forces chief of strategic planning, says the destruction of two or three key facilities would probably suffice. He singles out the Natanz uranium-enrichment complex and the conversion plant at Esfahan as critical.

It wouldn't be as easy as it sounds. Tehran, taking obvious lessons from Israel's successful 1981 bombing of Saddam Hussein's reactor at Osirak, has done its best to shield potential targets like Natanz. "They are dispersed, underground, hardened," says the senior Israeli military source. U.S. analysts say each facility would require multiple hits before serious damage was done. Still, the Israelis—who have an undeclared nuclear arsenal of their own, and refuse international inspections or oversight—insist they have all the firepower they need: more than 100 U.S.-made BLU-109 "bunker buster" earth-penetrating bombs. "I think they could do the job," says the senior Israeli source.

Logistics is a bigger hurdle. Each separate target would require a small fleet of aircraft. Israel's F-15s and F-16s would need advance escorts of "electronic countermeasures" aircraft to jam Iran's air-defense radars, and every one of those planes would need an entourage of fighter aircraft. At short range, Tehran's newly upgraded MiG-29 interceptors are a match for just about anything in the air. "To get there and bomb the facilities, that's the easy part," says Brom. "The difficult part is how to get back. We're not making kamikaze runs."

To hit Osirak in 1981, Israel's bombers flew in low over Saudi Arabia. In a study published late last year by the U.S. Army War College, Brom suggests that a strike against Iran's facilities could arrive by way of the Indian Ocean—roughly twice the operational radius of Israel's newest strike aircraft under optimal flying conditions. But Israel's fleet of specialized planes for in-flight refueling—five aging KC-130H tankers—doesn't have the capacity to get all those aircraft there and back again. The only way to manage it would be with a covert stopover midway—it's anybody's guess where.

The Israelis admit they can only disable the Iranian program, not destroy it. "The real question is what you achieve if the best you can do is to delay the project for a few years," says a senior U.S. administration official, speaking anonymously because it's a sensitive topic. The cost to the region's stability could be devastating. Meanwhile, Israel continues to upgrade its own arsenal, acquiring two new German subs that could launch nuclear-armed cruise missiles for a "second-strike" deterrent. Perhaps the threats are only a way of pushing the West to get tough with Tehran before the arms race gets even more heated. But if so, it's one hell of an act.

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11182458/site/newsweek/>

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Fairbanks Daily News-Miner

February 5, 2006

## More Work Set For Greely

By Sam Bishop, News-Miner Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON--Recent direction from Congress will allow the Missile Defense Agency to catch up on earlier plans to install more ballistic missile interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska, according to the agency's director. Congress, in the defense spending bill for the current fiscal year, shifted \$150 million to the MDA's budget for ground-based interceptors and away from other proposed agency programs, said Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry "Trey" Obering during an interview last week.

The congressional direction came at the end of a year in which the MDA added only two ground-based interceptors to the six already in the ground at Fort Greely, 100 miles southeast of Fairbanks.

The MDA had planned to add up to 10 interceptors in 2005.

Obering said he decided to cut back new installations at Fort Greely last year so the missile defense program would have enough interceptors to use in its tests. A review panel convened after the failure of two recently staged intercepts recommended more rigorous testing with missiles that duplicate those in launch silos, he said.

"So I diverted interceptors from our silo emplacement into our test program," Obering said. "Some of those interceptors won't fly. They will stay as ground test units. What the \$150 million does is helps us get back some of those interceptors we diverted into our test program and catch us back up on the emplacement schedule we were originally on."

Missiles installed at Fort Greely are not used in intercept tests due to the proximity of towns.

"We will continue to build and produce and emplace interceptors at Fort Greely," Obering said.

For security reasons, the agency no longer will announce when it installs interceptors, Obering said.

However, he said, he expects to have up to 40 interceptors between Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California by the end of 2009. Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, first added \$200 million for more interceptors and testing in the Senate version of the fiscal 2006 defense spending bill last fall. Stevens is chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee.

After Senate passage Oct. 7, the spending bill went to a Senate-House conference committee. It did not emerge until just before Christmas. The conference committee cut the \$200 million down to \$150 million in the final bill.

In a report accompanying the bill last year, the Senate Appropriations subcommittee objected to what it said was MDA's decision to virtually abandon efforts to improve the ground-based interceptors.

A spokeswoman for Stevens said the subcommittee included the statement, and the money, because the MDA had been very focused on research and development but needed to make the ground-based and Aegis ship-based systems usable. Obering said Thursday that the subcommittee's perception that MDA had stopped work on the ground-based interceptors resulted from a misunderstanding.

The agency is upgrading the ground-based interceptors, a technology that dates to the late 1990s when the country was still constrained by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, he said.

But MDA also has issued a contract to develop a multiple-kill vehicle payload to replace the current single-kill vehicles on the boosters.

"So what we meant was that the next major upgrade of the (ground-based missile defense) program from a kill vehicle perspective would be that MKV," Obering said. "We can take those 40 interceptors and turn them into an ability to counter much more complex threat suites."

The agency is also developing a much faster rocket, dubbed the kinetic energy interceptor. The interceptors will be mobile and so won't need underground silos like those at Fort Greely, Obering said.

Alaska, centrally located between East Asia and the Middle East, will remain an ideal location to place them, though, he said.

"Obviously since we have such a major investment in Fort Greely and in the area of Fairbanks, to me for logistics support purposes and everything else, that's very attractive in terms of where we may locate a deployable type of interceptor," Obering said. "That will be in the middle of the next decade."

Obering said the program is looking to spend \$7.5 billion to \$8 billion on research and development and \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion on deployment as it attempts to both develop and field a multi-layered defense.

President Bush's detailed 2007 budget proposal for the agency is to be released Monday.

<http://www.news-miner.com/Stories/0,1413,113~7244~3227499,00.html>

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USA Today

February 7, 2006

Pg. 1

## Iran Wants Nuclear Independence

*Official has little faith in Russian fuel offer*

By Barbara Slavin, USA Today

TEHRAN, Iran — Iran's national security adviser on Monday rebuffed a compromise that could defuse the growing confrontation between Iran, the United States and its European allies over Iran's resumption of its nuclear program. In an interview with USA TODAY, Ali Larijani said Iran is prepared to meet with Russian diplomats Feb. 16 about Russia's offer to provide nuclear fuel for Iran's energy program.

The Russian offer would ease U.S. and European concerns that Iran plans to use any fuel to build nuclear weapons, which Iran denies. Larijani said Iran has little faith in the Russian offer because previous promises by the West to provide the country nuclear fuel have been broken. "I think if a country has just a little brain, it would not depend on the fuel from another country," he said.

Larijani, a former head of Iranian state television with a reputation as a hard-liner, also said:

\*Iran would be willing to have direct talks with the United States about its nuclear program.

\*His U.S. counterpart, Stephen Hadley, exhibits "logical thinking" and is an improvement over the "neoconservatives" who advised President Bush.

\*"Bush lies a lot" and makes "irrational statements" about Iran.

The White House did not return a call seeking a response to the remarks.

Larijani's comments about direct talks contrasted sharply with those from a spokesman for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Gholamhossein Elham said Monday that Iran's policy of not talking with the United States had not changed.

The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Iran 26 years ago after Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held dozens of hostages there for 444 days.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has been authorized to meet with Iranian officials only about Iraq. Iran's recent decision to restart its nuclear energy program after a two-year freeze led to a vote Saturday by the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to send Iran to the Security Council for possible sanctions.

On Monday, the IAEA said Iran told the agency to remove its surveillance cameras and seals from sites and nuclear equipment by the end of next week, the Associated Press reported in Vienna.

### Defending Iran

Other points from Ali Larijani interview:

**On Iran being a U.S. ally:** "We don't need such an ally. What we need is independence."

**On intelligence showing Iran wants nuclear weapons:** "They need to take a hard look at the CIA; why are they manufacturing these lies?"

**On the Iraqi insurgency:** "I think Mr. Bush and his administration know very well that the terrorists that are operating in Iraq are from the countries that have very good and friendly relations with the United States. They have not come from Iran."

[http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060207/1a\\_bottomstrip07.art.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20060207/1a_bottomstrip07.art.htm)

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Los Angeles Times

February 7, 2006

## **Rejecting Cooperation, Iran Asks IAEA To Remove Seals, Cameras**

*Decision follows nuclear watchdog's vote to report Tehran to the Security Council. Data on activities may be reduced to a trickle.*

By Alissa J. Rubin, Times Staff Writer

VIENNA — Iranian officials sent a letter to the United Nations nuclear agency Monday requesting that it remove by mid-month any seals and surveillance systems on Iranian facilities still being monitored by international inspectors. The letter also said Tehran would end all voluntary compliance with the U.N. group.

Although Iran officially reopened its uranium enrichment plant at Natanz on Jan. 10, parts of the facility are still under seals placed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA.

Iran had been complying voluntarily with a set of rules that allowed inspections on short notice and the monitoring of many facilities, such as manufacturing plants, that make parts for its nuclear program. With voluntary compliance being terminated, access to those facilities as well as snap inspections will end.

The moves followed Saturday's vote by the 35-nation IAEA board of governors to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council because of Tehran's nuclear development program.

The watchdog atomic agency had many outstanding questions about Tehran's program and wanted more information about several locations where Iran is suspected of pursuing nuclear- and weapons-related research. But without voluntary cooperation, inspectors are unlikely to get the answers.

The letter sent to the IAEA, a copy of which was obtained by the Los Angeles Times, reads in part: "all the Agency's containment and surveillance measures which were in place beyond the normal Agency safeguards measures should be removed by mid-February 2006."

The letter states that Iran is obligated to take these steps because a law its parliament passed in November says the country must end voluntary compliance and restart uranium enrichment if it is referred to the Security Council.

Diplomats close to the IAEA said inspectors would travel to Iran in the next several days to remove remaining seals and surveillance devices such as security cameras, except those required under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a signatory. That means IAEA inspections will be far more limited, and they will have to be scheduled well in advance.

Although the letter merely makes good on threats Iran has voiced for weeks, it represents the nation's official decision, in the wake of the monitoring agency's emergency meeting, to thwart the will of the international community.

The resolution reporting Iran requires the government to cooperate with the IAEA and reinstate the full suspension of uranium enrichment activities, which could provide fuel for civilian nuclear power as well as material for a nuclear weapon.

The IAEA oversees two nuclear inspection regimes: safeguards under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and an "additional protocol."

Under the safeguard rules, the agency keeps track of enriched uranium and plutonium. Countries that are treaty signatories must inform the agency whenever they are processing uranium or using the substance for electrical power plants or other purposes so that the material is strictly monitored.

It is possible to perfect the techniques to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes — as Iran asserts it is doing — secretly move toward a weapons program, then withdraw from the treaty and make bombs. That was the course North Korea took in 2002.

Concerned that the treaty did not provide sufficient protections, the agency drafted the additional protocol. If signed by a government, the measure gives the IAEA broad access to facilities connected with that country's nuclear program, including manufacturing plants where enrichment machinery is made. With knowledge of how far a nation's technology has progressed, weapons inspectors can assess how capable it is of making nuclear arms.

So far, 106 countries have ratified the additional protocol. Iran had not signed on but was complying voluntarily. With that cooperation ended, it will be more difficult to keep tabs on Tehran's nuclear activities.



"The agency will simply not have the same ability to provide the international community with information about Iran's preparations to manufacture nuclear material.... It becomes a black hole," said Norman Wulf, the former special representative of the president for nonproliferation at the State Department.

"What's of most concern to the United States and its European allies right now is Iran's nuclear capability," he added. "So the right to look at these [manufacturing] facilities is extremely important at this stage."

Diplomats noted that the limits on inspections also will make it more difficult for Iran to prove that its program is peaceful.

[http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran7feb07\\_0,4530330.story?coll=la-headlines-world](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-iran7feb07_0,4530330.story?coll=la-headlines-world)

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London Times

February 7, 2006

## **Hawks Have Warplanes Ready If The Nuclear Diplomacy Fails**

By Richard Beeston, Diplomatic Editor

IT IS the option of last resort with consequences too hideous to contemplate. And yet, with diplomacy nearly exhausted, the use of military force to destroy Iran's nuclear programme is being actively considered by those grappling with one of the world's most pressing security problems.

For five years the West has used every diplomatic device at its disposal to entice Iran into complying with strict conditions that would prevent its nuclear programme being diverted to produce an atomic bomb.

Those efforts, however, are now faltering. US leaders are openly discussing the looming conflict. A recent poll showed that 57 per cent of Americans favoured military intervention to stop Iran building a bomb.

Tehran scoffs at threats by the West, has pledged to press on with its nuclear programme and defend itself if attacked.

The military option may be the only means of halting a regime that has threatened to annihilate Israel from developing a bomb and triggering a regional nuclear arms race.

Experts agree that America has the military capability to destroy Iran's dozen known atomic sites. US forces virtually surround Iran with military air bases to the west in Afghanistan, to the east in Iraq, Turkey and Qatar and the south in Oman and Diego Garcia. The US Navy also has a carrier group in the Gulf, armed with attack aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles. B2 stealth bombers flying from mainland America could also be used.

The air campaign would not be easy. The Iranians have been preparing for an attack. Key sites are ringed with air defences and buried underground. Sensitive parts of the Natanz facility are concealed 18 meters (60ft) underground and protected by reinforced concrete two meters thick. Similar protection has been built around the uranium conversion site at Esfahan.

"American air strikes on Iran would vastly exceed the scope of the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osiraq centre in Iraq, and would more resemble the opening days of the 2003 air campaign against Iraq," said the Global Security consultancy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Gardiner, a former US Air Force officer, predicted that knocking out nuclear sites could be over in less than a week. But he gave warning that would only be the beginning.

Iran has threatened to defend itself if attacked. It could use medium-range missiles to hit Israel or US military targets in Iraq and the region. It could also use its missiles and submarines to attack shipping in the Gulf, the main export route for much of the world's energy needs. "Once you have dealt with the nuclear sites you would have to expand the targets," said Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner. "There are another 125 to deal with including chemical plants, missile launchers, airfields and submarines."

While this huge US offensive is underway Iran would almost certainly deploy its most powerful weapon. It would unleash a counter-attack through proxies in the region. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia, would attack Israel. Moqtadr al-Sadr, the militant Iraqi Shia religious leader, could order his Mahdi Army to rise up against American and British forces in Iraq. Iranian-backed groups could wreak havoc against Western targets across the world. What began as a military operation to maintain a balance of power in the Middle East, could instead plunge the region into another conflict.

"It will have to be diplomats, not F15s that stop the mullahs," said Joseph Cirincione, an expert on non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "An air strike against the uranium conversion facility at Esfahan would inflame Muslim anger, rally the Iranian public around an otherwise unpopular government. Finally, the strike would not, as it often said, delay the Iranian programme. It would almost certainly speed it up," he wrote in an article.

### **Public Options**

'All options — including the military one — are on the table.' --**Donald Rumsfeld, US Defence Secretary**



'There is only one thing worse than military action, that is a nuclear armed Iran.' --**John McCain, Republican senator for Arizona and US presidential hopeful**

'We are not seeking a military confrontation, but if that happens we will give the enemy a lesson that will be remembered throughout history.' --**Abdolrahim Moussavi, head of Iran's joint chiefs of staff**

'Give another year to make HEU (highly-enriched uranium) for a nuclear weapon and a few more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009.' --**David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, Institute for Science and International Security**

'There isn't a military option. There certainly isn't one on the table, let's be clear about that.' --**Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary**

'Obviously we don't rule out any measures at all.' --**Tony Blair**

<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2027979,00.html>

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Christian Science Monitor

February 7, 2006

Pg. 1

## Russia And US As Global Nuclear Waste Collectors?

By Fred Weir and Howard LaFranchi

MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON - Against a backdrop of global efforts to address peacefully the concerns raised by Iran's nuclear power program, the US and Russia are proposing an international "partnership" for controlling the flow of weapons-grade uranium to those who might harbor military ambitions.

The plan, announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin last week and included in President Bush's budget sent to Congress Monday, would provide energy-starved countries with the fuel they need for generating nuclear power, while taking back the dangerous waste created in its production.

But some experts and critics say the proposal raises many questions for Congress to address, and the science behind the idea of breaking down spent fuels is unproven and dangerous. In any case, they add, the initiative would do little to make the world safer in the case of proliferating nuclear power generation.

In its description of the "Global Nuclear Partnership," the Department of Energy says the fuel supply and handling aspect of the proposal would be addressed "once technologies are proven" for nuclear plant reprocessing.

"What seems rather fanciful about this project is that the fuel-supply aspect appears contingent on proving some highly advanced technology," says Daryl Kimball, executive director the Arms Control Association in Washington.

"They're using this as a way to sell reprocessing technology rather than as a way to solve the problem of fuel supply, and that's troubling."

Other experts worry the proposal may simply be using heightened concerns over nuclear security and weapons of mass destruction as a way to get the US back into uranium-processing research - research the US gave up decades ago as uneconomical and dangerous.

"If the idea is to promote a sense of security at the same time that the development of large reactors to a long list of countries is promoted, then it's very misguided," says Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center in Washington. "They're trying to sell this as a nonproliferation initiative, but we shouldn't be so quick to cede that point."

The project, as described by President Putin, would confine the vulnerable stages of the nuclear fuel cycle - uranium enrichment and radioactive waste disposal - to a few specialized centers located in Russia, the US, and perhaps other countries such as France. That would plug a loophole in the current nuclear nonproliferation regime, allowing countries to enrich uranium on their own for "peaceful" purposes, which is the nub of the world community's current worries about Iran's intentions.

A significant problem with the proposal, according to nuclear experts in the US, is that the technology required for the plan to work remains unproven.

The idea of recycling or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel has been around since the Ford administration, but was put on hold then and under the subsequent Carter administration.

"The US decided three decades ago that [reprocessing] was not economical and not helpful for nonproliferation," says Mr. Kimball. "This would constitute the US giving up the long-term policy of disavowing reprocessing technology."

Under the plan, a version of which has already been offered by Russia to Iran, access to civilian reactor technology would be expanded for those countries willing to comply with the rules.

"We propose setting up a network of nuclear cycle centers for enriching uranium, and ensuring equal access for all who desire to share in the work of developing nuclear technology," Mr. Putin said in his annual news conference.

"We're talking about access without discrimination.... Russia is an obvious partner for resolving tasks of this kind, given the country's advanced nuclear power engineering, its scientific base, skilled personnel, and developed nuclear infrastructure," he said.

At a Saturday meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Russia voted with much of the world community to report Iran's suspected nuclear misconduct to the UN Security Council, but the resolution provided that any action be postponed for at least a month. Negotiations over Moscow's offer to transfer Iran's uranium enrichment to Russian facilities are set to resume on Feb. 16.

Experts say that if Tehran agrees to the plan, it could end the current crisis and improve chances for a broader tightening of the existing nonproliferation regime, which has been badly strained by nuclear breakouts by Pakistan, India and North Korea in recent years. "Russia is hoping to turn this situation from confrontation to compromise, and thus maintain its good relations with both the West and Iran," says Nikolai Kozyrev, an expert at the official Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, which trains Russian diplomats. "A great deal is at stake."

Russia has major economic interests, especially in the nuclear sphere, that would be threatened by any international sanctions regime or military action against Iran. The state-owned AtomStroiExport Co. is building an \$800 million, 1,000-megawatt light reactor power station at Bushehr in southern Iran, which the Russians insist is a purely civilian project under legal supervision by the IAEA.

"Iran is a major business partner, a good ally, and a big buyer of our nuclear equipment," says Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow.

"In fact, Iran's purchases are one of the only things keeping Russia's nuclear industry afloat. Russia's policy establishment will face a serious dilemma if the current crisis with Iran worsens: Should we side with the West, or with Iran? I'm afraid the answer of many in Russia's elite would be to take Iran's side. In that case, our relations with the West - which are already under strain - could slide into a new cold war."

Experts say success with Iran will be crucial if the international community is to develop the means to head-off other countries that might want to develop nuclear weapons in future. The question becomes especially acute in a world of energy shortages, where clean and reliable nuclear power is starting to look like an attractive alternative to costly fossil fuels.

"The time of skepticism about nuclear energy - the Chernobyl syndrome - is over, and in coming decades we will probably see a renaissance of nuclear energy around the world," says Anton Khlopkov, deputy director of the independent PIR Center in Moscow, which specializes in nuclear issues.

"In several years there could be as many as 20 countries with the basic know-how, that could give them the possibility to develop nuclear weapons. So, the kind of cooperation being proposed between the US and Russia could be an important tool for strengthening the nonproliferation regime."

For the Kremlin, which assumed chairmanship of the Group of 8 leading industrial democracies this year on a pledge to promote global "energy security," the diplomatic standoff over Iran presents a tough challenge and a huge opportunity.

"Putin has a grand energy strategy, which includes making Russia a reliable supplier of oil and gas to the world market, and putting it at the center of developing the global nuclear power industry," says Mr. Kremeniuk.

"Tightening the nuclear non-proliferation regime through greater cooperation, if it succeeds, is one thing that can be good for Russia, and good for the world."

Others note that the idea of providing fuel to - and taking spent fuel back from - energy-seeking countries is not new, and is one way of dealing with the reality that fuel enrichment technology - a process that can lead to material needed for development of nuclear weapons - has become more available.

That explains the growing interest in dealing with the spent fuels of nuclear power production. The International Atomic Energy Agency under director Mohamed ElBaradei has also proposed a program to supply fuel and take in spent fuels for storage.

"With about a 10-year supply of uranium there's a glut of fuel for ... reactors, and that's what's driving proposals like ElBaradei's," says Kimball. The IAEA proposal includes a five-year freeze on construction of fuel enrichment facilities while the international community works out the details of a fuel supply program - one the IAEA would administer.

The least objectionable part of the proposal, experts say, is the idea of a few secure fuel suppliers taking spent fuel back in for storage. But US experts look back at the domestic controversy over the Yucca Mountain storage facility and say such a plan for internationally produced fuels would require changes in US law - and would certainly raise new protests.

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0207/p01s03-wogi.html>

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### 3 Myths About The Iran Conflict

By Mel Levine, Alex Turkeltaub and Alex Gorbansky

Is there anything the West can do, short of a highly dangerous military option, to prevent Iran from going forward with its nuclear program? The answer is clearly yes.

Although a prolonged standoff with Iran over its nuclear program would pose significant problems for Western countries, including a probable rise in oil prices, the benefits of preventing a nuclear Iran would clearly outweigh the costs. We'd like to try to dispel some common myths on the subject.

*Myth 1: Economic sanctions would hurt the West more than Iran.* The premise of this argument is that any sanctions imposed on Tehran would result in a dramatic rise in oil prices, hurting the economies of Western countries and undermining public support for the sanctions.

But while Iran holds the world's second-largest reserves of oil and gas and is the fourth-largest oil producer, it is in fact a net *importer* of refined oil products, including gasoline. And internal consumption of oil products in Iran is growing by 5.2 percent a year, far faster than its ability to increase refining capacity. This means that the levels of imports necessary to make the Iranian economy function will only increase over time. Thus, sanctions that prevented Iran from importing, say, refined oil products, including gasoline, could bring its economy to a grinding halt.

Perhaps more important, the subsequent shortages would disproportionately affect President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political base, the urban underclass and lower-middle class, as well as the military.

No doubt there would be some cost to Western countries if Iran chose to retaliate by lowering or shutting down its oil production. But Iran would be unlikely to halt oil production for long, because under sanctions, it would depend more than ever on oil revenue to maintain its grip on power: As the economic situation in Iran worsened in response to sanctions, the government would have to rely on handouts and state assistance to maintain loyalty and support from the army and the general population.

Moreover, playing the oil card in a way that created a significant rise in oil prices would leave Iran isolated both in the Middle East and within OPEC. Most of the world's other oil producers, including Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Russia, believe that a significant further increase in prices is likely to undermine oil revenue because of a likely decrease in oil consumption in the West. In the long term, such price spikes could encourage investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, as happened after the oil shocks of the 1970s.

*Myth 2: Russia and China would never go along with sanctions.* While persuading Russia and China to support sanctions might take some time and effort, these countries are unlikely to prove reliable allies for the Iranian regime. Russia has little strategic interest in supporting the Iranian cause. While it may see Iran as a useful tool for balancing U.S. power in the Middle East, it has far more to fear from Iran's nuclear program in the long term than does the United States or Europe. Iran's support of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism across the Middle East and Central Asia is a direct challenge to Russian interests in territories that were part of the old Soviet empire and are still considered by Moscow to be within its sphere of influence. While playing the role of honest broker between Iran and the West certainly suits the Putin administration's goals of raising Russian prestige and influence, policymakers in Moscow are realistic about the challenges presented by Iran to Russia's long-term interests. While Russia is willing to search for a face-saving compromise, it is unlikely to support Iran to the bitter end.

The Chinese are also unlikely to stand in the way of a serious sanctions regime, particularly if forced to do so alone. While China has committed to substantial investments in Iran's oil and gas sector, it is unlikely to jeopardize its relationship with the United States and the European Union over the issue. Beijing also believes that while it should certainly let its views be known on important geopolitical issues, it is not yet ready to single-handedly resist the combined pressure of Western nations on an issue they consider of vital strategic importance to them.

*Myth 3: Iran might respond to sanctions by irrationally lashing out at Israel and other U.S. allies.* One of the most dangerous assumptions about Iran is that it is acting irrationally or is led by people who do not calculate the potential costs and benefits of their actions. But in fact, while one can challenge the logic that leads the Iranian leadership to seek nuclear weapons in the first place, the Iranians have acted with complete rationality in seeking to achieve their objectives.

For example, Iran has been careful to escalate this crisis slowly over the past two years, engaging in protracted talks with the "E.U. Three." Recently, as the likelihood of Iran's being referred to the U.N. Security Council has increased, the Iranians have patiently probed for fissures among the Western allies by offering to restart negotiations with the Europeans. The Iranian leadership has meticulously cultivated allies in India and China by signing lucrative oil deals with both countries, and it has reached out to Syria, another isolated Middle Eastern state. Even in its choice of timing for the most recent escalation Iran chose a moment when Israel, a key regional adversary, appeared headed for political disarray. None of these has been the steps of an irrational actor.

Iran's seeming brinkmanship, relative, for example, to the actions of North Korea, another aspiring nuclear power, stems not from irrationality but from a sense that the country has far more leverage over the West because of its oil wealth. At every step of the way, Iran has carefully calculated the likely response of its adversaries to various provocations and has tailored its approach accordingly.

The showdown with Iran over nuclear weapons is a difficult situation with few appealing options. But there are steps that can be taken to change Iran's calculations about the benefits of a nuclear weapons program. And while many of the options available could have significant effects on the global economy, the consequences for Iran would be far worse.

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